May 9: Biden Halts Aid to Save Hamas

State waives sanctions on arms sales to Lebanon, Qatar; BLM sues Tides; Is it antisemitic to criticize Soros for funding antisemitism?

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The Big Story

In an interview with CNN’s Erin Burnett on Wednesday, President Joe Biden finally made explicit what has long been implicit in his administration’s Israel policy. Responding to reports that the United States had paused an arms shipment to Israel, the president said:

I’ve made it clear to Bibi and the war cabinet that they’re not going to get our support if in fact they go into these population centers. We’re not walking away from Israel’s security, we’re walking away from Israel’s ability to wage war in those areas. 

To add insult to injury, Burnett asked Biden if he “heard the message” of campus protesters upset by reports from Gaza of “mass graves and summary executions, that there’s been evidence of.” Rather than point out that these reports are crude lies for which there is absolutely zero evidence, other than the say-so of the same Hamas sources that brought the world the fake IDF massacres at the Al-Ahli Arab Hospital and the aid convoy in February, the president merely said, “I hear the message.” Shivving an ally and laundering a blood libel—two outrages for the price of one!

But in truth, no one should be surprised. That the White House would ultimately attempt to use its leverage to preserve Hamas in Gaza was baked into the American response to Oct. 7 from Day 1. Indeed, it was the entire purpose of the administration’s messaging campaign to exonerate Iran and to forbid the Israelis from acting against Iran’s prize proxy in the region, Hezbollah, in the immediate aftermath of the attack. By framing the war as the latest skirmish in the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” and not as a hot front in the Iranian terror empire’s cold war against the U.S.-led regional order, the White House effectively set a trap for Israel. 

As Tony Badran wrote in Tablet on Oct. 12, referencing Barack Obama’s Oct. 9 X post calling on Americans to “stand squarely alongside our ally, Israel, as it dismantles Hamas” (emphasis ours): 

The text of Obama’s tweet is not entirely unimportant. It clarifies the point of American policy, which is to compel Israel to focus on Hamas in isolation, and not attempt to climb the escalation ladder against America’s preferred Middle Eastern partner [i.e. Iran]. Yes, go ahead, “dismantle Hamas.” The trap is already set, as evidenced in Biden’s speech and in the “advice” of the deputy national security council adviser, Jon Finer, who reminded Benjamin Netanyahu of the need to act according to the rule of law. “We uphold the laws of war. It matters.”

Israeli retaliation was built into both the Iranian war plan and Obama’s info op. In other words, Israel is being encouraged to retaliate against Hamas—at which point it will be duly roasted for killing civilians. Release your anger, Luke. But whatever you do, don’t hit the Iranians.

Don’t hit the Iranians—even if they directly hit you, as the mullahs did in April. We, the Americans, will guarantee your “defense,” even as we also guarantee the security of the Iranian satrapies on your border, cripple your ability to conduct offensive operations, and thereby effectively undermine both your sovereignty and security. 

But to be fair to Team Obama-Biden, they have long been clear about who they are and what they want in the Middle East. At some point, the Israeli leadership has a responsibility to acknowledge reality:

Or, to put it in terms that our former president would understand:

“I saved you,” cried that woman.
“And you’ve bit me even, why?
You know your bite is poisonous and now I’m going to die.”
“Oh shut up, silly woman,” said the reptile with a grin.
“You knew damn well I was a snake before you took me in.”

On Thursday, IDF spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said that “the IDF has armaments for the missions it is planning, including the missions in Rafah. We have what we need.” 

In his first official response to Biden’s warning, meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Thursday that if “Israel has to stand alone, we’ll stand alone.” We’ll see in the coming weeks and months if Bibi is willing to call Biden’s bluff.

IN THE BACK PAGES: A Tablet roundtable on what comes after Gaza, hosted by Tony Badran

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The Rest

→Less than a day before confirming its plan to withhold offensive weapons from Israel, the Biden administration announced plans to renew a sanctions waiver that allows the United States to sell weapons to Lebanon and Qatar, bypassing laws preventing arms sales to countries that do not recognize Israel. In a Tuesday notification to Congress obtained by Adam Kredo of The Washington Free Beacon, the State Department confirmed that it had issued a sanctions waiver bypassing congressional prohibitions on arms sales to a “host of Arab countries” that boycott the Jewish state, including Lebanon and Qatar. The State Department claimed the arms sales to Lebanon—which is controlled by Iranian proxy Hezbollah—would facilitate “U.S. support for Lebanese stability, sovereignty, and efforts to undermine violent extremist influences.” So we’ll send weapons to the fake army of a fake country controlled by a terror group to undermine “violent extremist influences” in said fake country. The hits just keep coming.

→Our Definitely-Not-a-Parody Quote of the Day:

Any kind of major Rafah ground operation would actually strengthen Hamas’ hand at the negotiating table, not Israel’s. That’s our view. 

That was National Security Council spokesman John Kirby speaking to reporters on Wednesday. Now you, as a simpleton, might think that degrading Hamas’ military power, killing its leaders, and seizing its territory would reduce its leverage in negotiations. But that’s why you don’t have a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and John Kirby does.

→And, from The Bulwark’s Bill Kristol and Andrew Egger, here’s our Poorly Aged Take of the Day:

The problem with being a useful idiot is that sometimes you just end up looking like an idiot. 

→But now, some good news: The Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation (BLMGNF) is suing the Tides Foundation for fraud and withholding more than $33 million in donations, according to a lawsuit filed Monday in California. According to reporting on the complaint in the New York Post, BLMGNF alleges that Tides, which acted as BLMGNF’s fiscal sponsor from 2020 to 2022, agreed via an “oral contract” that donations solicited by Tides for a BLM “collective action fund” would be made available for BLMGNF. The complaint, however, alleges that Tides has refused to hand over the cash and has instead distributed it to third-party organizations without BLMGNF’s authorization—including $4.75 million to BLM’s Oklahoma City chapter and an undisclosed amount to BLM Grassroots, a breakaway group led by the activist Melina Abdullah, who lost a lawsuit against BLMGNF earlier this year. The complaint also accuses Tides of effectively acting like a bank, but without being subject to banking regulations, charging its fiscal sponsorships the equivalent of “exorbitant interest” in the form of a 3% to 9% cut of all donations. 

In a statement to the Post, a spokesperson for the Tides Foundation called the allegations in the lawsuit “completely false.” And, to be fair, BLMGNF has been mired in legal issues and accusations of impropriety after raking in upwards of $100 million following the “racial reckoning” in Summer 2020. Co-founder Patrisse Cullors spent millions of dollars on at least four personal properties before resigning from the group in 2021, and BLMGNF used donor funds to secretly purchase a $6 million mansion in Los Angeles and an $8.1 million mansion in Toronto, which the founders reportedly used for parties.

→Chart of the Day:

That’s from a New York Times “investigation” titled “How Republicans Echo Antisemitic Tropes Despite Declaring Support for Israel.” The Times explains that it measured communications that “invoked Mr. Soros or globalists conspiratorially” or in ways that “evoked … historical tropes.” We’re going to take a wild guess here and assume that those include factually true claims that Mr. Soros—like other progressive oligarchs, Jewish and non-Jewish alike—has donated millions of dollars to an anti-Israel protest movement that has projected “Glory to the martyrs” on the buildings of $81,000-a-year universities, as well as to various other progressive and radical causes. 

And just in case any readers failed to get the message, the Times, in an otherwise irrelevant parenthetical following a mention of Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA), offered a helpful reminder to Jews about who their real enemies are supposed to be, in the estimation of the American establishment: 

(Evangelical Christians, who have been central to Republicans’ support for Israel, believe that God made an unbreakable promise to Jews designating the region as their homeland. Some also connect Israel’s existence to biblical prophecies about the last days before a theocratic kingdom is established on Earth and, some believe, those who do not convert to Christianity perish.)

After all, what’s a little “glory to the martyrs” among friends?

→On the same day that President Biden signed a bill reauthorizing Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which permits the warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens as long as they are in contact with someone located outside of U.S. soil, FBI Deputy Director Paul Abbate urged bureau employees to find ways to surveil Americans to justify the FBI’s 702 powers, Wired reports. In an April 20 email obtained by Wired, Abbate wrote, “To continue to demonstrate why tools like this are essential to our mission, we need to use them, while also holding ourselves accountable for doing so and in compliance with legal requirements.” He added, “I urge everyone to look for ways to appropriately use U.S. person queries to advance the mission.” Abbate’s email would seem to undercut 2023 testimony from FBI Director Christopher Wray in which he sought to reassure lawmakers that the bureau was focused on “dramatically reducing” the number of times it searched the 702 database for American citizens.

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TODAY IN TABLET: 

Haunted by Weimar, by Or Bassok

Israel’s Supreme Court relies on the discredited theories of Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt to justify its antidemocratic rule

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Due to Substack’s length constraints, what follows is an excerpt. A full version of the roundtable can be found here: https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/after-gaza-roundtable

After Gaza

A Tablet roundtable about the challenges facing Israel in Gaza, Lebanon, and Washington, with Elliott Abrams, Jeremy Ben-Ami, Amiad Cohen, Michael Doran, Jon Greenwald, and Lee Smith

by Tony Badran

Israel had barely begun its military operation in Gaza, after Hamas slaughtered 1,200 people and kidnapped 240 more, when the Biden administration began talking about what would need to happen the day after the war was over. “There has to be a vision of what comes next,” President Biden said on Oct. 25, 2023.

Subsequently, the term “the Day After” was everywhere. In part, it was a device used to cast doubt on the Israeli military operation altogether, presenting it as an emotional response born of trauma and driven by a desire for vengeance—base instincts that can be tolerated only for so long. Sure, smashing things might bring immediate, short-term gratification, but what’s the plan for “the Day After”?

Administration officials leaked how they were “frustrated by Netanyahu's unwillingness to seriously discuss plans for the day after.” What comes next, the president said on Oct. 25, “has to be a two-state solution.” That is, once Israel got its quest for blood out of its system, it needed to sit down and get with the plan—the underlying assumption being that Israel is responsible for (or at least capable of meaningfully shaping) Palestinian behavior. Clearly, the problem with Israel’s pre-Oct. 7 policy toward Gaza was that Benjamin Netanyahu needed to let more Qatari money and Iranian weapons into the Strip. Only by granting Hamas a state with full control over its borders and diplomatic relations with the European Union could future large terror attacks be prevented.

Needless to say, there is something completely insane about holding the victims of a horrific large-scale murder rampage responsible for the future happiness of their attackers. On the other hand, surely you don’t want this to happen again, do you?

To flesh out what could or should come next for Israel and the Palestinians, I have asked a group of accomplished colleagues to weigh in on some questions. Each one of these experts brings important perspectives. I think you’ll find their views, as well as their disagreements, illuminating.

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Elliott Abrams, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the chairman of the Vandenberg Coalition

Jeremy Ben-Ami, founder and president of J Street

Amiad Cohen, CEO of Herut Center and publisher of the Hebrew-language intellectual journal Hashiloach

Michael Doran, director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East and senior fellow at Hudson Institute

Jon Greenwald, former vice president of the International Crisis Group who also served for 30 years as an American diplomat

Lee Smith, author and regular Tablet contributor

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Tony Badran: What should “the Day After” look like in Gaza? What do you think it will actually look like?

Elliott Abrams: A group mostly consisting of former colleagues from the George W. Bush administration, myself included, has published a report called “The Day After: A Plan for Gaza.” We call for an International Trust for Gaza Relief and Reconstruction. The trust would be led by countries committed to a peaceful, demilitarized, deradicalized Gaza, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States. It would marshal relief and reconstruction funds; coordinate with Gazans in the diaspora and in Gaza who can help the common goals; work with Israel; and work with nations, international organizations, and NGOs committed to the same goals.

Security is perhaps the toughest problem in postwar Gaza. We suggest a combination of efforts: some existing, vetted non-Hamas Gaza police personnel; new police trained by the United States at our Jordan International Police Training Center; forces from Arab countries that are establishing refugee camps, tent cities, or the like in Gaza and might be willing to protect what they’re building; and private security companies to protect food convoys, warehouses, housing areas, and other important locations. It may also be possible to give local civic and business groups or clans some security responsibilities if they have or can create the capacity to keep the peace locally.

Hamas and Iran will continue to foment and undertake acts of terrorism in Gaza to the extent they can, and Israel will need to be able to enter Gaza whenever required to fight terrorism and destroy Hamas remnants.

Now, is all of this likely? It’s conceivable, but continuing Hamas terrorism and criminal violence, continuing IDF activity, and a shortage of nations willing to help in any serious way suggest that it is not a good bet. It would help enormously if the United States marshaled the positive forces, but that will be a largely thankless and very difficult task. If I were betting, I’d place my wager on chaos, hardship, controversy, and a long struggle against the terrorist remnants of Hamas.

Jeremy Ben-Ami: Like all wars, the horrific Israel-Hamas conflict will end. Like many, it will probably not be with a surrender or peace agreement between the combatants. It is nearly certain that the aggressor, Hamas, will have lost its governmental capacity in Gaza but will likely be alive and well as a political and insurgent force.

Understanding the 2023 to 2024 Gaza tragedy demands placing it in the context of a century of a larger, often-violent dispute between Jews and Palestinians. The massacres committed by Hamas on Oct. 7, the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza resulting from the war’s subsequent conduct, the looming threat of new regional fronts, the disruption in the United States and Europe of civil relationships and domestic political loyalties—including the abhorrent rise of antisemitism and Islamophobia—make clear that minimalist efforts to achieve Middle East security by working around the Palestinian question have failed.

President Biden began the search for a more ambitious approach shortly after Oct. 7 while underscoring his support for a path forward that would ultimately provide for an independent Palestinian state beside Israel. But more is needed.

Ideally, by the time the fighting ends, the U.N. Security Council and/or the Arab League will have supplemented that initiative with implementation parameters; the Palestinian Authority (PA) will have made progress on reforms needed to reclaim its legitimacy; and a coalition will have been formed of states prepared to do heavy lifting in Gaza. That coalition will need to promptly take on administrative and security responsibilities, invite the PA to move relatively quickly into Gaza, support it as it gradually assumes more responsibility there, and commit to a Marshall Plan-like effort to rebuild Gaza, invest in the West Bank, and assist reconstruction of Israel’s damaged southern and northern border areas. Regional Arab states should be persuaded to form the coalition’s core for Gaza management, while the United States and Europe should join them in the Marshall Plan-like exercise.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration is already stretched dealing with immediate issues, which suggests that key elements may not be ready when the shooting dies down.

If so, there is a risk that important matters such as administrative responsibility for Gaza; PA preparations; international parameters; and, above all, structuring the environment so as to minimize Israeli interest in retaining close responsibility for Gaza and maximize incentives to choose engagement with the international community on the way forward will be handled day-to-day and ad hoc. This would make it more likely that cautious crisis management, not bold resolution, will predominate.

Michael Doran: The day after what? Obviously, we are discussing the day after the war ends, but what exactly is the nature of this war? Who are the belligerents? What are they fighting over? What constitutes victory? And how will we ever know that the conflict has ended and that, indeed, we have arrived at “the Day After”?

These questions don't have clear-cut answers. From the outset, the Biden administration has presented the conflict as a Palestinian-Israeli war, but that framing is objectively false. Because Iran and its proxies are clearly a party to this war, one might be tempted to say it is an Iranian-Israeli war. Tehran-backed forces, however, have repeatedly hit American targets. Properly understood, the Iranian-led Resistance Axis is making war against the U.S.-led regional order.

Only when Iran is defeated, therefore, do we arrive at “the Day After.” Until that time comes, the question that should be at the forefront of our minds is whether the diplomatic initiatives that Washington is taking are likely to foil Iran’s plans.

All the talk that the Biden administration has generated about “the Day After” fails to perform that service. Just weeks after Oct. 7, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a Senate hearing that the most sensible political goal of the war “would be for an effective and revitalized Palestinian Authority to have governance and ultimately security responsibility for Gaza.”

First, there is no such thing as an “effective” Palestinian Authority. The Biden administration is trying to organize a cavalry charge while mounted on a donkey. Second, the donkey is unwelcome in Gaza. Hamas emasculated the Palestinian Authority a decade and a half ago, and there is no sign that the Gazans are eager to “revitalize” it. Finally, and most important, the effort to resurrect the failed two-state solution sets the United States at odds with the Israelis—all Israelis. From the center-left to the far-right, voters reject the idea of a reformed Palestinian Authority taking control of Gaza. No major party endorses the plan.

The Biden administration is also helping, with its voice, to advance the objectives of Iranian political warfare. By sparking “the Day After” debate, Washington is doing Tehran’s work for it, creating the impression, globally, that the issue of Palestinian sovereignty is the core problem to be solved and that, moreover, the Israelis are the primary impediment to the achievement of that sovereignty.

We would be much wiser to talk about what we need to see on the day before “the Day After”—namely, the total demise of Hamas. Let’s postpone all talk of a new political order until the hard military work is done.

Amiad Cohen: In 1943, during World War II, President Roosevelt stated in a press conference, “Peace can come to the world only by a total elimination of German and Japanese war power. This involves the simple formula of placing the objective of this war in terms of an unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies.”

History validated Roosevelt's stance. In 1943, few could have predicted Japan's transformation into one of the most pacifist societies in the world or Germany's adoption of liberalism and staunch measures against hate speech and antisemitism. Their wartime ideologies were crushed through total defeat by the Allies, paving the way for true peace.

The same principle applies to Gaza. Any discussion about “the Day After” in Gaza must first presuppose the complete surrender of Hamas. Before Oct. 7, we weren't striving for a decisive victory. Much like the movie Groundhog Day, we found ourselves trapped in a repetitive cycle, moving from one operation to the next, hesitant to disrupt the status quo until Hamas forced our hand. Now we know that the cycle cannot be allowed to go on. Hamas must be crushed.

Achieving that objective is crucial for any future negotiation since it will shape the trajectory of the path forward.

Lee Smith: Since the foundational premise of the U.S.-Israel alliance is that Israel’s strategic moves advance American peace and prosperity, I want to recast the question: What should “the Day After” in Gaza look like in the United States?

Due to a massive failure of U.S. political, academic, and security elites, American universities are filled with foreign students whose admission not only satisfies diversity benchmarks but also fills the universities’ coffers. Since these are the children of international elites, they almost always pay full tuition, funded either by their families or their governments, often the same thing. These students constitute the core of an activist movement that has roiled college campuses and the streets of U.S. cities for seven months.

Obviously, it is not Israel’s job to discipline the children of our elites. But a conclusive Israeli victory will slow the momentum of the pro-Hamas demonstrators and restore some degree of normalcy—until foreign powers like China and progressive NGOs fabricate the next cause célèbre to destabilize America.

What that victory looks like is Hamas destroyed as a social and political as well as military force, with the top echelons of its leadership dead—not in prison where they’re only one kidnapping of an Israeli away from freedom. Also, a buffer zone large and desolate enough to astonish those who look upon it.

The United States has imposed red lines on Israel in Lebanon, where Washington has deepened investment and partnership with fictional “state institutions,” turning that Iranian satrapy into a de facto U.S. protectorate. There’s been chatter about a U.S. initiative to create a 10-kilometer buffer zone in south Lebanon, but as the history of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 makes clear, that’s just a fairy tale. So the hope of achieving that objective through a U.S.-mediated “deal” seems in vain. Or worse, a trap. Given this reality, how does Israel intend to impose a buffer zone in south Lebanon?

Amiad Cohen: Currently, there are 83,000 refugees from Israel’s north. Israel cannot allow this situation to continue. Given the lack of progress in achieving a diplomatic solution for the implementation of UNSCR 1701 since 2006, Israel may have no choice but to act unilaterally to push Hezbollah beyond the Litani River, regardless of the American position.

With the Litani River serving as a formidable topographical barrier and the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon, Israel’s northern residents will finally be able to return to their homes and enjoy a measure of security.

In addition to involving the Saudis and Emiratis in “Day After” plans for Gaza, the administration is also still pushing some sort of three-way deal with Israel and Saudi Arabia, which the administration has made contingent on some Israeli commitments to the Palestinians. With the U.S. regional posture being what it is—appeasement of Iran and elevation of the Palestinians—is the prospect of a peace deal with the Saudis a trap for Israel?

Mike Doran: Yes, it is certainly a trap. Remember, the administration came into office so hostile to the Abraham Accords that it prohibited State Department officials from using the term.

The necessity of achieving a two-state solution before brokering closer relations between Israel and the Arab world is the dogma of Democratic national security circles, and it remained so even after the Abraham Accords. The pursuit of the two-state solution had gained the status of a sacrosanct mission, a quest that justified itself, as opposed to a pragmatic tool for achieving a clearly defined goal.

But there’s another reason for the hostility: The accords were organically connected to the Trump administration's rejection of President Obama’s Iran policy, which we have called in Tablet “the Realignment.” The nuclear deal served as the flagship of the Realignment, but Obama sought nothing less than to change the role of the United States in the Middle East, to build a regional order on an entirely new basis. He transformed the United States from the leader of a coalition to contain Iranian conventional power and to prevent Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon into a mediator between America's traditional allies and Iran.

The administration’s about-face on supporting normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel allowed it to escape the ridicule it faced over its comical aversion to the accords. But the administration has carefully crafted the initiative so as to force Israel to promote the rise of a Palestinian state. Whereas the Abraham Accords ended the Palestinian veto on peace agreements between Israel and Arab states, Biden's normalization push reinstalls it.

Irrespective of its chances for success, the administration pursues the policy because it offers additional incentive to the Israelis to comply with its wishes for a reformed and revitalized Palestinian Authority to rule over Gaza. In addition, the policy distracts the pro-Israeli American electorate from the advances that Iran is making toward building a nuclear weapon and from the expansion of the power of its Resistance Axis.

The more the Israeli government indulges the White House on the issue, the more it deflects from the issue that should be at the center of a joint American-Israeli policy: namely, confronting Iran.

The scenario for Gaza and the West Bank that Jeremy Ben-Ami laid out envisions a set of internationalized “special provinces” whose economy, governance, and security will be managed by the United States, Europe, and regional actors. Also, from what I gather, Iran will be part of the regional managing board, essentially cloning the current arrangement in Lebanon.

Assuming Saudi Arabia et al. agree to bankroll this type of arrangement for Gaza and the West Bank, can you please explain how locking in Iranian dominance under a U.S. umbrella (A) serves the U.S. national interest and (B) serves Israel’s national interest.

Jeremy Ben-Ami: You have misunderstood my position. I do not advocate “internationalized special provinces” with the management you cite. I certainly do not propose that Iran join a managing board for such an arrangement. I urge that Gaza and the West Bank be brought together quickly, under international guidance and protection, and specifically that the Arab states—whom I consider the only realistic candidates to take on early postwar administrative, management, and security responsibilities in Gaza—invite the Palestinian Authority into the Strip. That invitation would be accompanied by mentoring, aided by the United States and others, so that the PA that enters Gaza and retains its West Bank role will be broader-based and more genuinely representative than the present superannuated entity. Its assumption of responsibilities in Gaza would depend upon a gradual—but not endless—process that would help prepare it for the ultimately essential task of new final status negotiations with Israel.

Arab willingness to take on a central role in rebuilding Gaza and creating a clear and achievable path to an independent Palestinian state requires, in turn, important tokens of Western, in particular U.S., support.

What I want with regard to Iran is not that it assume a significant role in the management of Gaza and mentoring of the PA, but that it stand aside from, and ultimately accept the path to, an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. I am arguing that the United States consider welcoming the détente that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are pursuing with Iran and encouraging our Arab friends through these newly opened channels to dissuade Iran from sabotaging the Palestinian process by leveraging and conditioning the benefits of that détente.

As for the responses of my roundtable colleagues, we have difficulty offering coherent comment. They seem to come in considerable degree from an alternate political universe, indeed a partly dystopian one. Much of their responses deal only with Gaza, essentially ignoring the West Bank, in implicit denial of meaningful Palestinian rights and in a curious mirroring of the disastrous Netanyahu policy of encouraging Palestinian division that contributed to the horror of Oct. 7. The most I can do is put out a few questions of my own.

Should the United States prioritize a long-term goal of defeating Iran or an immediate goal of obtaining Iranian forbearance from attempting to destroy progress toward a two-state solution in order for Tehran to reap the benefits of its growing détente with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states?

Lee Smith: This is a good opportunity to correct a crucial misunderstanding about the roots of Oct. 7. While denying that Iran had any operational role in the attack, Biden officials have argued that Hamas was motivated to act because its Iranian patrons regard Israeli-Saudi normalization as an existential threat. But that’s a misrepresentation of reality. It was by pushing that normalization deal that the Biden administration knowingly pushed Hamas, and thus Iran, onto the playing field.

As Mike explained earlier, the Abraham Accords is how the Donald Trump administration rebuilt the U.S. traditional Middle East alliance system after the Barack Obama White House crashed it in favor of Realignment with Iran. The Biden White House calls Realignment “regional integration.”

Also, and this was crucial to the Trump plan—the Abraham Accords moved the Palestinians off center stage. The last White House saw that a tiny terror enclave cannot be allowed to make decisions over war and peace for the entire region, as it has for half a century. Moreover, since the most effective Palestinian faction, Hamas, is an Iranian proxy, giving the Palestinians any say in regional affairs means seating Iran at the negotiating table. The point of the Abraham Accords was to lock Iran out.

The Abraham Accords represented a solid diplomatic win for U.S. statesmanship: Acknowledge your allies openly and reward them; outflank your adversaries to isolate them. So, naturally, the Biden White House was determined to collapse it. Eventually it figured out that the way to undermine the agreements was under cover of expanding them.

There was no need to get Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) involved since they had already effectively signed off on normalizing relations with Israel. That’s what the agreement with Bahrain represents. The point of bringing in the Saudis was to introduce a poison pill: the Palestinians. Thus it was by dragging in the Saudis that the Biden administration returned the Palestinians and Iran to center stage.

What do the Israelis get for letting Hamas survive? The Saudis can’t guarantee there won’t be another Oct. 7—they can’t protect themselves from Iran, or they wouldn’t be asking the Americans for assurances. What about those Arab peacekeeping troops that Biden officials are talking about sending to Gaza? The United Nations' international force in Lebanon is bad enough. There is no scenario in which Moroccan or Emirati or Omani troops will shoot at Palestinians to protect Israel.

Of course it had to come to this because that’s what happens when your aim is to strengthen U.S. adversaries at the expense of U.S. allies, which is the essence of regional integration, more formally known as the concert system, which is designed to ensure “balance.”

Read the rest here: https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/after-gaza-roundtable